

3001 Even as the agrarian intellectuals emphasized listening  
3002 to disparate voices from below, *Planning Democracy*  
3003 emerges principally from official sources, and it shows.  
3004 We hear little from farmers or others in rural communities  
3005 across the country, whether included in or excluded from  
3006 the USDA's planning efforts. Did planning really encour-  
3007 age deliberation and deepen democracy? Did its effects  
3008 linger after the formal plans ceased?

3009 Yet the Intended New Deal remained stillborn. The  
3010 central problematic of scholarship around the New Deal  
3011 during the last generation asks how a Congress domi-  
3012 nated by segregationist Southern Democrats shaped  
3013 myriad policies to tame the market and build the state.  
3014 That same Congress closed off funding for state and  
3015 county planning. Gilbert fails to connect his story to that  
3016 larger project; we do not even learn which chamber killed  
3017 the USDA's planning efforts. Nor does he connect the end  
3018 of the Intended New Deal with the other ways that the  
3019 conservative coalition shaped and limited reform. If  
3020 Gilbert fails to tackle the question, one reason surely lies  
3021 in the agrarian intellectuals' own understandings of their  
3022 obligations, around the department's fiefs and outward to  
3023 the various networks of land-grant colleges, state Extension  
3024 services, and agents and farmers on the ground, rather  
3025 than to their political principals.

3026 The book closes the curtain—or, better to say, lays  
3027 down the trowel—in 1942. By emphasizing his similarities  
3028 with the other practical-minded agrarian intellectuals,  
3029 Gilbert says little about the enigmatic Henry Wallace. In  
3030 1948, the Iowa farm editor and chicken breeder launched  
3031 a radical insurgency alongside some of the very men he had  
3032 fired in the purge of 1935. It would have been salutary to  
3033 compare both the innovative planning proposals of the  
3034 Intended New Deal and the Deweyan concepts behind  
3035 them with the campaign Wallace waged in 1948.

3036 Beyond the scope of *Planning Democracy*, the Intended  
3037 New Deal went global. Taylor, Tolley, and Wilson all  
3038 worked on agricultural development for the Ford Founda-  
3039 tion in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, as Daniel Immer-  
3040 wahr's recent book (*Thinking Small*, 2015) about postwar  
3041 international community development shows, its record  
3042 was a decidedly checkered one. Did the farm boys from the  
3043 American heartland ultimately leave their deepest mark in  
3044 South Asia?

3045 For all his careful reconstruction of the agrarian  
3046 intellectuals' hopes and plans, Gilbert is no antiquarian.  
3047 The Intended New Deal, he suggests, offers contemporary  
3048 lessons to avoid the perils of needless competition,  
3049 centralized bureaucracy, and elite control alike, in favor  
3050 of what Allin once termed "a working democracy in the  
3051 planning process" (p. 246). Yet the very distance between  
3052 the agrarian intellectuals' "last gasp of a democratic Pro-  
3053 gressivism" (p. 255) and our own time suggests—even  
3054 more than Gilbert wants to acknowledge—how distant  
3055 now seems their dream.

**The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government:  
How Congress and Federal Agencies Process  
Information and Solve Problems.** By Samuel Workman.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 208p. \$99.99.  
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— Miranda Yaver, *Washington University at St. Louis*

3061 Recent years have witnessed a marked resurgence in  
3062 scholarly attention to bureaucratic policymaking and its  
3063 location within the broader separation-of-powers frame-  
3064 work in which these laws are carried into effect. Such  
3065 scholarship has shed important new light on such  
3066 questions as the mechanisms governing congressional  
3067 structuring of agency interactions over implementation,  
3068 the reach of executive branch oversight of agencies  
3069 through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs  
3070 (OIRA), strategic timing of rulemaking, and the ways in  
3071 which agencies use the implementation authority dele-  
3072 gated to them by statute. Within this dialogue of political  
3073 science and public administration, Samuel Workman's  
3074 *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government* offers  
3075 new insights into the agenda-setting mechanisms of the  
3076 legislative—executive interplay over policymaking in re-  
3077 cent decades, beginning in 1983.

3078 Important to Workman's study is the centrality of  
3079 bureaucracy to the policies that ultimately emerge in this  
3080 model of American politics, rather than agencies charac-  
3081 terized as engaging in the rote implementation of policies  
3082 passed down by Congress. While models of agency  
3083 implementation have served to elucidate the strategic  
3084 dynamics underlying congressional strategies of legislative  
3085 design and delegation, the important role that agencies  
3086 maintain throughout the policy *making*, as well as imple-  
3087 menting, phase, cannot be overstated, and is acknowl-  
3088 edged fully in Workman's theory of agenda setting.  
3089 Indeed, the author notes that this key policy influence  
3090 persists "even when it appears that the elected branches of  
3091 government are unresponsive ad macro politics seems  
3092 stale" (p. 159), with members of Congress and bureaucrats  
3093 both continually active in shaping the policy outcomes  
3094 that we ultimately observe. And in evaluating bureaucra-  
3095 cies' role in this process, Workman puts forward a rich new  
3096 data set comprising the coding of more than 200,000  
3097 regulations identified in the Unified Agenda, which in  
3098 itself will pave the way toward understanding new sets of  
3099 key questions about the American administrative state.

3100 At the core of Workman's analysis is the *dual dynamics*  
3101 of the administrative state—formed by the tension be-  
3102 tween democratic authority and bureaucratic expertise—  
3103 whereby agencies engage in problem solving and bottom-  
3104 up influence, at which point Congress steers information  
3105 processing by way of problem prioritization and agenda  
3106 setting. In the first stage of the bottom-up process,  
3107 bureaucracies detect and identify problems that carry  
3108 policy consequences, with the necessary precondition that

3121 agencies must have the autonomy to monitor and detect  
 3122 problems that warrant attention across a range of issues.  
 3123 Bureaucracies then define the detected problem in a way  
 3124 that facilitates government action, attaching causes to  
 3125 policy consequences and potentially calling attention to  
 3126 some dimensions of a policy while downplaying others so  
 3127 as to improve the agency's ability to influence elected  
 3128 officials in taking up the given issue. Having defined the  
 3129 issue, the bureaucracy then generates the relevant in-  
 3130 formation and conveys it to elected officials.  
 3131  
 3132 The top-down aspect of the policymaking process here  
 3133 involves, in part, congressional prioritization of issues,  
 3134 which Workman links to the creation and authorization  
 3135 of bureaucracies in the first place, with congressional  
 3136 delegation to agencies and coordination among them.  
 3137 Within this agenda setting, Congress engages in the  
 3138 processes of *issue shuffling*, which influences the problems  
 3139 being monitored and the strength of bureaucracies' signals  
 3140 about those problems, along with *issue bundling*, in which  
 3141 legislation alters the ways in which issues relate to one  
 3142 another, thus altering the composition of interests that are  
 3143 mobilized and the policies that are salient. And given  
 3144 agencies' incentives to maintain prominence in the policy  
 3145 landscape, agencies often respond by recasting their agenda  
 3146 in terms of those issues prominent on the congressional  
 3147 agenda, thus "alter[ing] the interrelationship of issues on  
 3148 the agenda and the proximity of various bureaucracies  
 3149 monitoring these issues and generating the information"  
 3150 (p. 118). Such processes of congressional issue prioritiza-  
 3151 tion produce direct competition among agencies moni-  
 3152 toring issues on the agenda and generating information  
 3153 utilized by Congress. Thus, Workman's treatment pushes  
 3154 the literature to consider a more nuanced dynamic  
 3155 interplay between Congress and agencies in policymaking,  
 3156 with both top-down and bottom-up processes shaping the  
 3157 institutions' information environment and the policy  
 3158 agenda that ultimately is set.  
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 3160 Rather than providing the familiar scenario of Demo-  
 3161 cratic control of bureaucracy associated with pro-regulation  
 3162 versus Republican control with deregulation—such as with  
 3163 the "regulatory relief" efforts of the 1980s—Workman  
 3164 emphasizes the strong regulatory role that agencies maintain  
 3165 throughout the time series. A challenge, with no easy  
 3166 solution, is ascertaining the extent to which conservative  
 3167 agencies, while still taking regulatory action, were in fact  
 3168 scaling back, relative to proposed policy changes. An analog  
 3169 to this concept in the context of appropriations politics is  
 3170 the allocation of funds at levels lower than those requested,  
 3171 potentially not in keeping with increased regulatory  
 3172 responsibilities. In the context of agency policymaking,  
 3173 while not engaging in outright retrenchment, a key omitted  
 3174 variable is interest groups' and others' demands for regula-  
 3175 tory action, which can serve as a useful baseline in evaluating  
 3176 Democratic- and Republican-controlled agencies' respon-  
 3177 siveness in policymaking. This can be particularly salient in

3181 those cases in which appointees are less supportive of the  
 3182 overarching mission of the agency in which they operate,  
 3183 a setting in which we might expect agenda-setting inter-  
 3184 actions to be different from those under friendlier agency  
 3185 leadership.  
 3186  
 3187 Workman demonstrates in a number of instances  
 3188 marked disjunctures in signaling by bureaucracies, con-  
 3189 gressional prioritization of issues, and bureaucratic issue  
 3190 attention un der conditions of Democratic versus  
 3191 Republican control of Congress, with the change-point  
 3192 being the Republican Party's sweeping victories in the  
 3193 1994 midterm elections with its Contract with America. A  
 3194 fruitful avenue for future research would be to disentangle  
 3195 these dynamics further in order to evaluate in a more  
 3196 nuanced manner the precise political configurations in  
 3197 which the institutions operate. That is, from 1983 to  
 3198 1994, there is divided partisan control of Congress with  
 3199 a Republican executive branch (1983–86); a unified  
 3200 Democratic Congress with a Republican executive branch  
 3201 (1987–92); a unified Democratic Congress with a Demo-  
 3202 cratic executive branch (1993–94); a unified Republican  
 3203 Congress with a Democratic executive branch (1995–  
 3204 2000); and a unified Republican Congress with a Re-  
 3205 publican branch (2001–6). Each of these different config-  
 3206 urations can, in ways central to Workman's theory,  
 3207 reshape the choice sets available to Congress and bureau-  
 3208 cracies and the policies that ultimately emerge through  
 3209 these institutional interactions.  
 3210  
 3211 For example, given asymmetric dynamics of congres-  
 3212 sional control of more proregulatory versus deregulatory  
 3213 agencies (such as with Congress's ability to exercise the  
 3214 power of the purse to preclude more than to spur  
 3215 regulatory action), the agenda-setting processes should  
 3216 likewise be affected by that composition of institutional  
 3217 preferences. And while both Democratic- and Republican-  
 3218 controlled Congresses are held accountable for taking  
 3219 action with respect to passing legislation and regulating  
 3220 policy, and Democratic- and Republican-controlled agen-  
 3221 cies pass regulations, the *content* of that policy is hardly  
 3222 identical under different administrations and should in-  
 3223 fluence the ways in which the branches interact over the  
 3224 policy agenda. Understanding these more fine-grained  
 3225 dynamics would go a long way toward making more  
 3226 precise predictions as to congressional coalitions' varied  
 3227 propensity to define and monitor problems in certain  
 3228 ways, and to engage in the processes of *issue shuffling* and  
 3229 *bundling* in accordance with Workman's theory.  
 3230  
 3231 To be sure, all models necessarily require simplifying  
 3232 assumptions, and there are limits to what any one treatise  
 3233 can alone accomplish. The limitations that I have  
 3234 addressed here offer guidance as to future directions in  
 3235 which to consider the ongoing interbranch interactions  
 3236 that characterize policymaking in the United States, and  
 3237 to evaluate the regulatory (and deregulatory) processes at  
 3238 work over time. Workman's evaluation makes an

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important, novel advance in our understanding of the dynamic relationship between Congress and bureaucracies as they work to identify, frame, and respond to policy

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## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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**Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco: Governing Kurdish and Berber Dissent.** By Senem Aslan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 250p. \$95.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592716000773

— Aysegul Aydin, *University of Colorado at Boulder*

When do people rise up against their governments? Senem Aslan’s answer to this popular question is when people become aggrieved as a result of state repression. States are centralizing agencies and punish forces that resist these attempts. They routinely repress minority groups for expression of their culture, which they consider a challenge to a totalizing central rule. The latter in turn resist such attempts, some of which turn violent as in the example of the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey. Others find a way, though an uneasy one, to coexist with the center, as Berber nationalists have done in Morocco. Aslan demonstrates in great detail the Turkish state’s policies, starting with the single-party era as Turkish statesmen attempted to integrate Kurdish areas in the Southeast into their nation-building project. These attempts, according to the author, mostly took the form of assimilation where expressions of ethnic identity were banned in the public sphere and were replaced with nationalistic ones. In a similar fashion, she documents the Moroccan state’s symbolic gestures to Berber activists, starting with the postcolonial period that included cultural rights as long as they were exercised under the monarch’s watchful eye.

*Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco* opens with an important empirical puzzle: Two ethnic minorities in the Middle East context exhibit very similar features. However, the evolution and outcome of their political claims within the nation-state framework show wildly different patterns. Aslan attributes these differences exclusively to states’ policies, whereby ethnic movements are suppressed in one case and appeased with cultural concessions in the other. Her evidence shows that the Moroccan king skillfully engaged in political maneuver that allowed him first to retain his significance under French colonial rule and then to survive under the nationalist Istiqlal Party and eventually overthrow it. He adopted an ambiguous mix of Moroccan nationalism, Islam, and Arabism and refrained from undertaking an ambitious transformation project to upset the tribal hierarchy. This was mainly because his survival depended on appeasing the rural masses, most of whom were of Berber origin. The Moroccan king’s strategy seems to reflect the median Middle East experience, where fragile centers with ties to Western powers

problems, and his rich empirical contributions lay the groundwork for further expanding our understanding of these policymaking processes.

patched up a “state” from local powerholders, which worked in some cases and utterly failed in others.

While the Moroccan case is a familiar one, Turkish nation building is unique in its experimentation with modernization: After a hard-won peace, Turkish nationalists had public support and were independent of international pressure to replace the fragile societal status of Ottoman rulers, much like the Moroccan king, with a sense of nation and nationhood. Therefore, Aslan’s choice of Turkey in a comparative case study of minority—state relationships against the backdrop of state formation in the Middle East is an appropriate one, but since the Moroccan case is typical of the region’s experience, as in the foundation of Jordan, most readers will be left wondering why the author made this particular choice and will be looking for a justification of case selection in the book.

In her Introduction, Aslan asks why some states repress their minorities while others do not, but the answer remains limited to this chapter. The succeeding chapters address the “how states repress” question, mostly detailing the individual policies that Turkey and Morocco adopted to respond to the politicization of ethnic identities. The book is organized temporally and traces state policies from independence to the present day, rather than around mechanisms to address the causality between state policies and the course of minority nationalisms.

The author’s choice does not allow the book to substantiate some of the critical arguments, and it reads as an agglomeration of evidence. For instance, Aslan argues that while both states adopted repression toward minority groups, the Turkish state indiscriminately targeted the Kurds whereas repression was selective in Morocco. However, she does not present systematic evidence that would support this argument. Similarly, the reader is left to wonder the scale of repression in the Turkish case. Aslan mentions that local officials rejected registering Kurdish names. It is not clear if these were isolated incidents involving a few rogue regional administrators or if they were part of a systematic effort. The latter would require evidence to determine how prevalent the practice was. Similarly, the use of historical material from the early Republican era points to less clear patterns than the author expected. Given that most initial uprisings by Kurdish tribes were organized by members of Hamidiye Regiments established to fight Armenian nationalists, it remains a question if these groups were making ethnic claims or were using their military skills to force the center into a better deal. Similarly, counterinsurgency operations in the early era were not necessarily conducted in response to a rebellion but, instead, aimed to contain tribes that engaged in banditry.

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