

PLSC 803: American Politics III: Institutions

Spring 2017

Class Time: Monday 3:30-5:20

Professor: Miranda Yaver

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Office Hours: Wednesday 1:30-3:30 or by appointment

This course will be a graduate political science course that is a survey of research – both classic and more current – on a range of American institutions, ranging from Congress to the president to the bureaucracy to courts to state political institutions. It is intended primarily for first- and second-year political science PhD students, but others may take the course with permission. Because it is a graduate survey-level course, the reading load is heavy, and there are many recommended readings for the purpose of digging deeper into topics of particular interest as well as preparing for comprehensive exams.

Over the course of the semester, we will examine models of American institutions, discuss their organization and governance, and evaluate the relationship between institutional structure and the laws and policies that emerge from them. Classes will aim to clarify and probe the puzzles of institutional design and policy implementation in the American separation of powers system, examining both the substance and methods of the assigned readings. Students will be expected to come to class having read the material, and prepared to engage actively in discussions critiquing the arguments and methods employed to answer these questions. Students should end the semester with a firm grasp on the core debates in research on American institutions, both the strengths and limitations in the extant literature.

Course Requirements:

- Five short papers (5-7 pages, double-spaced) critically responding to the week's readings: 12% each.
 - Respond to one or more of the readings for five weeks of your choosing. You may make substantive or methodological critiques, but be sure to engage with the material and what you may see as its strengths or weaknesses. Do not simply summarize the arguments, but rather engage with such questions as whether the argument is logical, take issue with its assumptions, take issue with its methods, discuss how the readings support or are intension with one another, or suggest avenues for further research in light of limitations you see in the readings.
 - Must be submitted no later than 10am the day of class.
- Submit 5 discussion questions for three weeks on which you're not writing response papers: 5% each.

- May address substance and/or methods, but should critically engage with the readings and when submitting discussion questions, should be prepared to lead part of discussion that week. Must be submitted no later than 10am the day of class.

- Attendance and participation: 25%

Availability of Readings: Most of the readings for the course are journal articles and thus can be easily accessed online. A number of readings are from books that I recommend purchasing online, where they can be found relatively cheaply.

Final Course Grading: The final grade for the course will be assigned based on the following scale:

A: 93+%	A-: 90-92%	B+: 87-89%
B: 83-86%	B-: 80-82%	C+: 77-79%
C: 73-76%	C-: 70-72%	D+: 67-69%
D: 63-66%	D-: 60-62%	F: > 60%

Policy Regarding Late Assignments: It is imperative that students turn in work at the specified deadlines. If an extension is needed or you need to change the date on which you are submitting discussion questions, please alert me in advance. Otherwise, a grade reduction will be made.

All members of the academic community should be able to engage fully in the academic opportunities and services provided, regardless of disability status, and to that end accommodations to this course can be made if necessary. Please feel free to discuss with me any concerns you may have.

Statement on Academic Integrity: It is expected that all students will work in accordance with the student honor code. Thus, plagiarism, cheating, and receiving unauthorized assistance with the work in this course will not be tolerated. Should a student violate academic integrity in this class, the matter will be reported to the university administration. If you have questions about citations of sources, ask prior to submitting the given assignment. You may also refer to the Yale Writing Center: <http://ctl.yale.edu/writing/using-sources>

COURSE OUTLINE (SUBJECT TO CHANGE):

Week 1, Jan 23: Introduction to Institutions

Polsby, Nelson. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *APSR*.

Diermeier, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism As A Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.15(2): 123-144.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton. Chapters 1-2 and Chapter 11.

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Introduction and Chapters 1-3.

Recommended:

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.

Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review*. 74:432-46.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing The Commons*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3, 6.

Katznelson, Ira and John Lapinski. 2006. "At the Crossroads: Congress and American Political Development." *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (June): 243-260.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

McDonagh, Eileen. 1993. "The 'Welfare Rights State' and the 'Civil Rights State': Policy Paradox and State Building in the Progressive Era." *Studies in American Political Development* 7: 225-74

Week 2, Jan 30: Congress and Its Members

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.

Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. Yale University Press. Chapter 1, 4-6.

Carson and Jenkins. 2011. "Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 14:25-46.

Grimmer, Justin, Solomon Messing, and Sean Westwood. 2012. "How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation." *American Political Science Review*. 106(4): 703- 719.

Polsby, Nelson W. and Eric Schickler. 2002. "Landmarks in the Study of Congress since 1945." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 5: 333-367.

Anderson, Sarah E., Daniel Butler, and Laurel Harbridge. 2016. "Legislative Institutions as a Source of Party Leaders' Influence." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41(3): 605-31.

Recommended:

Fenno, Richard. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *American Political Science Review*. 71(3): 883-917.

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review*. 82(2):405-422.

Masket, Seth E. 2008. "Where You Sit is Where You Stand: The Impact of Seating Proximity on Legislative Cue-Taking." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 3(3): 301-311.

Lo, James. 2013. "Legislative Responsiveness to Gerrymandering: Evidence from the 2003 Texas Redistricting." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(1): 75- 92.

Week 3: February 6: Legislative Organization

Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy*. 96(1): 132-163.

Krehbiel, Keith. *Information and Legislative Organization*. 1991. Chapters 1-3.

Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda* (Cambridge 2005), Chapters 1-3, 10-11.

Powell, Eleanor and Justin Grimmer. 2013. "Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal." *Journal of Politics*, 75(4): 907-920.

Recommended:

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1979.

Fenno, Richard F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Little Brown and Company. Chapters 1-4.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *American Political Science Review*. 81(1): 85-104.

Adler, E. Scott and John S. Lapinski. 1997. "Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41(3): 895-918.

Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2015. "Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork." *AJPS*.

Week 4: February 13: Do Congressional Parties Matter?

Krehbiel, Keith, "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23 (1993), pp. 235-266.

Krehbiel, Keith (2007) "Partisan Roll Rates in a Nonpartisan Legislature," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 23(1): 1-23.

Carson, Koger, Lebo, Young, 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 54(3): 598-616.

Harbridge, Laurel and Neil Malhotra. 2011. "Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55(3): 494-510.

Butler, Daniel M. and Eleanor Powell. 2014. "Understanding The Party Brand: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Valence." *Journal of Politics*. 76(2).

Recommended:

Binder, Sarah A. and Forrest Maltzman. 2002. "Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-98." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (January): 190-9.

Binder, Sarah A., Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. "Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party." *Journal of Politics*, 61 (August): 815-831.

Harbridge, Laurel, Neil Malhotra and Brian F. Harrison. 2014. "Public Preferences for Bipartisanship in the Policymaking Process." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 39(3): 327-355.

Clinton, Joshua. 2012. "Using Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 15: 79-99.

Aldrich, John. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look*. University of Chicago Press. Ch 1-2, 6-7.

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House*. University of Chicago Press. Ch 1, 2, 6.

Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde. 2001. "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In *Congress Reconsidered*, 7th edition. Edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Pages 269- 292.

Week 5: February 20: Electoral Accountability

Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review*. 57(1): 45-56.

Ansolabehere, Snyder, Stewart. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45(1): 136-159.

Butler, Daniel M. and David W. Nickerson. 2011. "Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 6: 55-83.

Bafumi, Joseph and Michael Herron. 2010. "Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress." *APSR* 104 (3): 519-542

Krimmel, Katherine L, Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin Phillips. 2013. "Gay Rights in Congress: Public Opinion and (Mis)Representation."

Recommended:

Lax, Jeffrey and JH Phillips, "The Democratic Deficit in the States." *AJPS* 2012.

Lax, Jeffrey and JH Phillips. 2009. "Gay rights in the states: Public opinion and policy responsiveness." *APSR* 103 (03), 367-386.

Healy, Andrew and Neil Malhotra. 2013. "Retrospective Voting Reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 16: 285-306.

Ashworth, Scott. 2012. "Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work." *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Fenno, Richard F. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *American Political Science Review*. 71(3): 883-917.

Ansolabehere, Snyder, Stewart. 2001. "The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 26(4): 533-572.

Grimmer, Justin. 2013. "Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Week 6: February 27: Political Consequences of Institutions

Lee, Frances E. 2000. "Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics." *American Political Science Review*. 94(1): 59-72.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Alan Gerber, and James Snyder. 2002. "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States." *APSR*, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), pp. 767-777.

Berry, Christopher R. and Anthony Fowler. 2015. "Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork." *AJPS*.

Rogowski, Jon C. Forthcoming. "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.

Jowei Chen. 2010. "The effect of electoral geography on pork barreling in bicameral legislatures." *AJPS*.

Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2012. "Policy Makes Mass Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 15:333-351.

Anderson, Sarah E. and Jonathan Woon. 2014. "Delaying the Buck: Timing and Strategic Advantages in Executive-Legislative Bargaining over Appropriations." *Congress and the Presidency* 41(1) 25-48.

Recommended:

Shepsle, Ken, and Barry Weingast. 1994. "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19(2): 149-179.

Wawro, Gregory and Eric Schickler. 2004. "Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-cloture Senate." *The American Journal of Political Science* 48:758-774.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder and Michael M. Ting. 2003. "Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?" *American Political Science Review* 97:471-481.

Lee, Frances E. 2003. "Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits?" *American Journal of Political Science*. 47(4): 714-728.

Rosenthal, Howard. 1990. "The Setter Model," in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds., *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*. Cambridge University Press, 191-211.

Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. "After Enactment: The Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs." *American Journal of Political Science*. 54(1):1-17.

Chen, Jowei and Jonathan Rodden. 2013. "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(3): 239-269.

Week 7: March 6: Presidential Power

Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*. Free Press. Ch. 1-3.

Kernell, Samuel. 1997. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. CQ Press. Ch. 1-2.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Ch 1-3, 5, 7, 8.

Reeves, Andrew and Jon C. Rogowski. 2016. "Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency." *Journal of Politics* 78: 137-151.

King, Gary. "The Methodology of Presidential Research." *Researching the Presidency*. ed. Michael Nelson. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Recommended:

Hart, John. 1998. "Neglected Aspects of the Study of the Presidency." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 1:379-99.

Bowles, Nigel. 1999. "Studying the Presidency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:1-23.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*. Harvard University Press. Ch. 1-4.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, William G. Howell and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis." *Journal of Politics*. 70(1):1-16.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(2): 183-208.

Gallagher, Maryanne and Bethany Blackstone. 2015. "Taking Matters Into Their Own Hands: Presidents' Personality Traits and the Use of Executive Orders." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 45(2): 221-246.

Feigenbaum, James J. and Cameron A. Shelton. 2013. "The Vicious Cycle: Fundraising and Perceived Viability in US Presidential Primaries." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(1): 1-40.

Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton University Press.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "The President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 313-329.

Week 8: March 27: Presidency and Separation of Powers

Cameron, Charles. 2000. *Veto Bargaining*, Ch. 1-7.

Groseclose, Tim and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 100-19.

McCarty, Nolan. 2009. "Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?" *Journal of Politics* 71: 369-384.

Mayhew, David. *Divided We Govern*, Ch. 1-4.

Recommended:

Cameron, Charles and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 409-435.

Howell, William G. 2011. "Presidential Power in War." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 14:89-105.

Berry, Burden, Howell. 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending." *American Political Science Review*. 104(4): 783-799.

Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996." *American Political Science Review*. 93(3):519-831.

Week 9: April 3: Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation

Gordon, Sanford and Catherine Hafer. 2005. "Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review*. 99(2): 245-262.

McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3(2): 243-277.

Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure" in *Can the Government Govern?* Edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson. The Brookings Institution.

Ting, Michael M. 2003. "A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 274-292.

Farhang, Sean and Miranda Yaver. 2015. "Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law." *American Journal of Political Science*. 60: 401-17.

Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers*. Ch. 4-6.

Recommended:

Gordon, Sanford C. 2011. "Politicizing Agency Spending Authority: Lessons from a Bush-era Scandal." *American Political Science Review*. 105(4): 717-734.

Gailmard, Sean and John Patty. 2012. "Formal Models of Bureaucracy." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 15: 353-377.

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion?*

Carpenter, Dan. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*.

Wilson, James Q. 1991. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. Basic Books. Ch 1, 2, 20.

Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. Vol. 6, Special Issue.

Lewis, David and Josh Clinton. "Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences." *Political Analysis* 16(1):3-16 (2008).

Gersen, Jacob & Anne Joseph O'Connell. "Hiding in Plain Sight?: Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State." 76 *University of Chicago Law Review* 1157 (2009).

Spriggs, James. 1997. "Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court Opinions." *Political Research Quarterly* 50:567-93.

Week 10: April 10: Law and Courts

Lax, Jeffrey R. and Cameron, Charles M. 2007. "Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 23-2: 276-302.

Bonneau, Chris W., Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck. "Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct., 2007), pp. 890-905

Carrubba, Cliff, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, and Georg Vanberg. 2012. "Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?" *AJPS*. 56(2):400-12

Clark, Tom and Benjamin Lauderdale. 2010. "Locating Supreme Court Opinions in 'Doctrine Space.'" *AJPS*.

Lax, Jeffrey R. and Kelly Rader (2015) "Bargaining Power in the Supreme Court: Evidence from Opinion Assignment and Vote Switching." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 2015), pp. 648-663.

Farhang, Sean. 2008. "Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System." *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 821-39.

Recommended:

Landes, William & Richard Posner. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective." *Journal of Law and Economics* 18 (1975): 875-901.

Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 2013. "Reconsidering Judicial Preferences." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 16: 11-31.

Lax, Jeffrey R. 2011. "The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 14:131-157.

Rosenberg, Gerald. 1991. *A Hollow Hope*.

Pritchett, C. Herman. 1948. "The Roosevelt Court: Votes and Values." *The American Political Science Review*. 42(1): 53-67.

Kagan, Robert A. 1991. "Adversarial Legalism and American Government." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*. 10(3): 369-406.

Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1998. *The Choices Justices Make*.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Matthew Stephenson. 2002. "Informative Precedent and Intra-judicial Communication." *American Political Science Review*. 96(4): 755-766.

Spaeth, Harold J. and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1999. *Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 9.

Martin, Andrew D., Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger, and Pauline T. Kim. 2004. "Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making." *Perspectives on Politics*. 2(4): 761-767.

Gordon, Sanford C. and Gregory A. Huber. 2007. "The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 2(2): 107-138.

Cameron, Charles M., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. "Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions." *American Political Science Review*. 94(1):101-116

Clark, Tom S. 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy." *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(4): 971-989.

Boyd, Christina L., Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin. 2010. "Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging." *American Journal of Political Science*. 54(2):389-411.

Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 2000. "Field Essay: Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead." *Political Research Quarterly*. 53(3): 625-661.

Lax, Jeffrey R., and Kelly T. Rader. 2010. "Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making: Do Jurisprudential Regimes Exist?" *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 71-2 (April), 2010.

Sen, Maya. 2015. "Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Appellate Review in U.S. Courts." *Journal of Legal Studies* 44(S1):S187-S229.

Stephenson, Matthew C. "'When the Devil Turns...': The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review." 32 *Journal of Legal Studies* (2003).

Farhang, Sean. "Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991." 2009. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 6: 1-34.

Bonica, Adam, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema, and Maya Sen. 2016. "Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Clerk Hiring." In press, *American Law and Economics Review*.

Fischman JB, Law DS. 2009. "What is judicial ideology, and how should we measure it?" *Journal of Law and Policy* 29:133.

Week 11: April 17: Interest Groups

Carpenter, Daniel. 2002. "Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval." *American Journal of Political Science*. 46(2): 490-505.

Hall, Richard L. and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review*. 84(3):797-820.

Blanes I Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2012. "Revolving door lobbyists." *American Economic Review*. 102(7): 3731-3748.

Anzia, Sarah F. 2012. "The Election Timing Effect: Evidence from a Policy Intervention in Texas." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 7(3): 209-248.

Querubin, Pablo and James M. Snyder. 2013. "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(4): 409-450.

Skocpol, Theda, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. "A National of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civil Voluntarism in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 94(3): 527-546.

Recommended:

Moe, Terry M. 1981. "Toward a Broader Theory of Interest Groups." *Journal of Politics* 43(2): 531-543.

Hojnacki, Marie, David C. Kimball, Frank M. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech. 2012. "Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 15:379-99.

Baumgartner and Jones (2009) - Ch 9-11

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2001. "Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics." *Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1191-1213.

Olson, Mancur. 1966. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Harvard University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6.

Walker, Jack. 1983. "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in the United States." *American Political Science Review*. 77(2): 390-406.

Week 12: April 24: Federalism, State, and Local Politics

Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Ch 1, 15-17, 31.

Engstrom, Erik J. and Samuel Kernell. 2005. "Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840-1940." *American Journal of Political Science*. 49(3): 531-549.

Kousser, Thad and Justin H. Phillips. 2009. "Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 34(1):55-85.

Lax, Jeffrey R. and Justin H. Phillips. 2012. "The Democratic Deficit in the States." *American Journal of Political Science*. 56(1): 148-166.

Butler, Daniel M. and David E. Broockman. 2011. "Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55(3): 463-477.

McCarty, Nolan and Boris Shor. 2011. "The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures." *American Political Science Review*. 105(3): 530-51.

Recommended:

Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. *Statehouse Democracy*.

Squire, Peveerill. 2006. "Historical Evolution of Legislatures in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 9:19-44.

Rodden, Jonathan. 2010. "The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 13:321-340.

Tam Cho, Wendy K. and James G. Gimpel. 2012. "Geographic Information Systems and the Spatial Dimensions of American Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 15:443-460.

Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *American Political Science Review* 88:63-76.

Dinan, John. "Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions." 32 *Journal of Federalism* (2002): 1-24.

Ferejohn, John & Barry Weingast. 1997. *The New Federalism: Can the States be Trusted?*